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properties such as adjacency, which could be registered on the retina, were a reflection
of the form of outer intuition. Only properties such as extent and shape (A21/B35),
which depend on the third dimension, would derive from this form.
19. See Falkenstein (1998) for the opposing view.
20. See below p. 433 for further discussion of this point.
21. The name selection comes from Falkenstein, 1995, 424, n. 4, but the possibility was
originally outlined by Guyer, 1987, 349, 363.
22. I am making the simplifying assumption that the direction of the projection is orthog-
onal to the plane.
23. I should note that Guyer (1987, 33 37) and Falkenstein (1995, 96 97) argue that Kant
gave up this theory of the Inaugural Dissertation, before he wrote the Critique.
24. Here she is opposing the view originally offered in Philip Kitcher, 1986.
25. My understanding of this issue has been influenced by Falkenstein s (1995, 326 327)
discussion of empirical affection . Because he regards the phenomenal, especially
the phenomenal self, as fake (1995, 348, 352), he would not accept my subsequent
440 / Patricia Kitcher
claim about the causal relation between the faculties of the cognitive subject and the
spatio-temporal aspects of representations. I believe that Falkenstein s clear account
of empirical affection brings him very close to the solution to the long-standing
charge of internal inconsistency that I propose in this paper. He does not see it that
way, I believe, because he believes that Kant held that space, time, and the categories
were subjectiveNO.
26. For reasons I will not try to defend here, I take the argument of the chapter on phe-
nomena and noumena to be that all knowledge must be based on sensory data. From
this claim, plus the claim in the text, it follows that all cognition must be an interpre-
tation based on our own standards.
27. I offer the qualification, because, as we have seen, cognition does depend on some
patterns in the sensory data.
28. Prauss himself lapses into confusion at this point. Prauss does not understand how we
can describe external objects [or, by extension, sensory data] as phenomenal , be-
cause that would imply that they have already been interpreted, whereas the role they
play in transcendental epistemology is the data to be interpreted (1977, 221 ff.). But
Prauss is simply confusing the epistemologist with the cognitive subject. The problem
to be solved is no more difficult than how an epistemologist can describe pre-conceptual
intuitions.
29. See Guyer (1987), chapter 10, for an extended defense of this point.
30. I am grateful to Philip Kitcher and Thomas Sturm for helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
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